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THE TASK FORCE ON
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS-PICKETING
T. E. ARMSTRONG*
The Woods Task Force Report's recommendations on the law of
picketing contain at least one important internal contradiction. On the one
hand, a vigorous and convincing plea is made to reduce the power now
residing in the courts to control picketing through the equity injunction. On
the other hand, in defining the area of jurisdiction to be transferred to a
reconstituted Canada Labour Relations Board, the Task Force would leave
control over the preponderance of important picketing cases with the courts.
If this is a correct analysis, the Task Force is guilty of fostering a serious
illusion.
The theme of this comment, then, is twofold: first, that the Task Force
is correct in its suggestion that organized labour is profoundly disillusioned
with the role of the courts in picketing disputes, and that if a breakdown in
the system is to be avoided, there must be a transfer of jurisdiction to a
specialist tribunal which has the confidence of both management and labour;
and secondly, that the Task Force, in recommending that control over the
"how" of picketing be retained by the courts, has failed in its presumptive
purpose to effect a significant reduction in the court's role and to restore
union confidence in the enforcement apparatus.
The Task Force has correctly identified organized labour's distrust of
the courts and has warned against the damage to society at large should that
feeling become a "pervasive conviction" . t What the Report does not do
is to explain, except in the most cursory way, the reasons for labour's attitude.
It is surely important to attempt to do so. If, for example, it flows from an
unthinking and biased hostility to the judicial establishment, the case for
change is weakened, for it is surely a dangerous principle in a democratic
society to effect change simply because a minority group is, without justification, distrustful. If, as I believe to be the case, the distrust flows from real,
rather than imagined, defects, the imperative for reform gains strength.
No one denies - least of all the author of the Royal Commission Report
on Civil Rights - that special reasons and circumstances may exist for conferring judicial powers on tribunals other than the courts. The reasons most
commonly advanced are the need for specialization and expertise in the
personnel of the tribunal to facilitate the administration of justice, and the
need for a special procedure for greater speed, accessibility, economy and
informality than can be provided by the procedure in the ordinary courts.2
*Mr. T. E. Armstrong is a partner in the law firm of Armstrong and MacLean, Toronto.
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How to be satisfied, and to satisfy the community at large, that there are
justifiable reasons for ousting the jurisdiction of the courts in the field of
picketing? The following are some of the arguments heard from trade
unionists, and their supporters.
1. The most common contention - perhaps also the most superficial - is
the "class" argument. Trade unionists, so it is said, have a deep-rooted
conviction that the economic and social philosophies of most judges are in
fundamental opposition to the goals of organized labour. Judges, because of
their professional training, as well as their social and economic backgrounds,
cannot reasonably be expected to be objective when the interests of management and labour clash. Moreover, so the argument goes, there is an innate
hostility which those trained in the law, practicing lawyers as well as judges,
feel for the collective bargaining system - a system which countenances the
use of the strike and lockout, weapons of economic blackmail, to further the
demands of the combatants. Instinctively lawyers strive for rational solutions;
labour and management are engaged in a raw economic battle, where the
one with the greater power to injure his opponent economically will prevail.
When the courts do become involved in this struggle, it is natural that a
distaste for the system will be expressed. Typically, the involvement occurs
in the strike situation. The court has no detailed knowledge of the history of
the dispute nor the merits or reasonableness of the respective positions of the
parties. Almost inevitably, at that stage, the union appears as the aggressor,
the employer as the beleaguered defender of his plant and property. The
irrationality of the system, the militancy of the union-aggressor, the predisposition to uphold the sanctity of private property concepts - all these
factors conspire against the union and make it very difficult to sway a court
with arguments about freedom of speech and peaceful assembly.
It must be said that labour's analysis of the attitude of the legal and
judicial establishment appears to be confirmed by the rhetoric of the Rand
Report. There, aspects of the collective bargaining process are variously
labelled as "irrational", "barbaric", "uninformed", and "ultimately violent".
The strike is referred to as "an anarchic weapon". The picket line is
denounced in particularly provocative language:
"To non-striking employees, it may be an intimidatory warning; to a replacement,
a message of malevolence; to the employer, an expression of detestation."8

The unions claim that this ominous lack of sympathy reflects the court's
attitude. The result has been, as the Task Force observes, "a deepening of a
feeling among labour leaders at all levels that there is a bias in favour of
management interests in the substantive and procedural law and in the admini4
stration of justice".
2. A less emotional argument advanced by some labour leaders is that under
the present system, unions do not have equal access to the courts. Specifically,
they argue that injunctive relief is not available to them. A resourceful
employer can construct a case for limiting or eliminating picketing, by
3 Royal Commission Inquiry into Labour Disputes (The Rand Report) 1968, p. 29.
4
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injunction, with relative ease. However, the existing statute and common law
precludes a trade union from obtaining injunctive relief, even in those
instances where employers are guilty of flagrantly illegal practices.
In re Tilco PlasticsLtd. v. Skurjat, et al,5 the court observed:
"It should also be noted that the use of injunctions is not limited to employers.
Unions or individuals have an equal right to avail themselves of the law where
employers or others create the necessary grounds. In the past, some unions quite
properly have come to the courts for protection."

Is that so? It is a fact that unions, or dissident groups within unions, have, in
the past, sought injunctive relief to protect property rights in internal disputes. 6
However, under existing law, unions cannot invoke the equity injunction to
protect rights flowing from collective agreements. The 354th Chanter of the
Revised Statutes of Ontario, somewhat euphemistically referred to as "The
Rights of Labour Act", prevents a collective agreement being made the
subject of an action in the courts. Accordingly, attempts to enjoin employers
from violating clear collective agreement obligations have failed, without
recorded exception: see, for example, Shank v. The K.V.P. Company Ltd. 7
Cummings v. The Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario.8 Equally,
the courts are without power, under the present system, to enjoin employer
infractions of The Labour Relations Act. Application may be made to the
appropriate Labour Relations Board for consent to prosecute. If a prosecution ensues and the criminal onus can be satisfied, token fines may result
which, because of their inadequacy, have no real deterrent effect. It is true
that the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act 9 gives certain
remedial jurisdiction to provincial courts if consent to prosecute is obtained
from the Minister of Labour. Because of the difficulties and inevitable delays
in obtaining consent and meeting the criminal onus, this is rarely invoked.
There appears to be substance, then, in the observation that the courts
become involved, for the most part, only in those conspicuous situations
where management is seeking to have restrictions imposed upon picketing
rights. Management's parallel weapon - a lockout - is seldom used, and,
when it is, there is rarely occasion for the court's intervention to restrict or
limit its impact.
Simply because of the context of the court's involvement, it becomes
easier to understand the origin of labour's stereotyped picture of judges as
alien agents of obstruction and interference, meting out penalties which,
consciously or otherwise, tip the balance in management's favour. On the
other hand, the image of the administrative tribunals, in the eyes of labour, is
less one-sided. Under the relevant statutes, labour relations boards are
given the power to grant positive and meaningful remedies to complainant
unions and aggrieved employees. If an employee is discharged for union
5 (1966) 2 O.R. 547.

6 Re The International Nickel Company of Canada Limited; Shedden v. Kopinak
(1949) O.R. 765.
7 (1966) 2 O.R. 847.

8 (1966) 1 O.R. 685.

9 tS.C., 1952, C.152, S. 40 (2).
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activity, the Ontario Labour Relations Board may reinstate him with full
compensation. 10 If an employer is engaging in unfair bargaining practices,
the board may order it to cease and desist. Moreover, these are not remedies
which are rarely invoked or sparingly granted. An examination of the reports
of the Ontario Labour Relations Board proceedings will indicate the nature
and extent of the positive and continuous role played by the Board in
regulating unfair practices.
Partly because of the scheme of the enabling statutes and partly, it must
be said, because of the conscientious and even-handed administration of those
statutes, the various provincial boards have gained general acceptance by
both management and labour. This requirement of acceptability is one of the
strongest grounds in support of the Task Force's recommendation to utilize
an existing tribunal and confer upon it powers now exercised by the courts.
More than in any other field, perhaps, acceptability is an essential prerequisite
to the successful administration of labour relations.
3. Trade unionists point as well to what appears to them to be a bewildering
lack of consistency in the jurisprudence defining the nature and extent of
permissible picketing. Anyone practicing in the labour field must recognize
the difficulty in advising a client, whether union or management, whether
peaceful, mass picketing may be enjoined. The judicial ambivalence towards
mass picketing is illustrated in several recent Ontario decisions. The prevailing view (at least until the SCM (Canada)Limited v. Motley case") appeared
to be that mass-picketing per se was intimidatory, and hence enjoinable, the
courts having tended to regard intimidation, coercion and violence as necessary
concomitants of mass picketing. That view is echoed in the Rand Report,
which speaks of "illegal action" as the "inevitable consequence" of mass
picketing. 12 Some relaxation of this rigid view was indicated in the SCM case,
where the court held that, absent evidence of obstruction, intimidation or
interference with the delivery of goods or the entry of suppliers and customers,
there is no justification for limiting the number of pickets. The same reason
was apparently applied in the CanadianH. W. Gossard v. Tripp case's but a
return to the earlier view that mere numbers may be objectionable is suggested
in Hanes of CanadaLimited v. McConnell.'4 There, a limitation on picketing
was imposed on days when large numbers of employees congregated to receive
their pay cheques at a trailer adjacent to the struck premises. The limitation
was justified by the court to avoid the "atmosphere of intimidation" which
was found to arise from the mere congregation of pickets.
Aside altogether from the merits of the mass-picketing argument, this
lack of consistency has increased labour's scepticism about the role of the
courts. Hopefully, a more uniform jurisprudence would emerge if jurisdiction
were transferred to a specialist tribunal.
10 Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1960, C. 202, as amended, S. 65.
" (1967) 2 O.R. 323.
12 The Rand Report, op. cit, p. 32.
13 (1968) 1 O.R. 230.
14 70 C.L.L.C. para. 14005.
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4. Some trade unionists argue that the courts have failed to recognize the
legitimate aims of picketing and have tended to enjoin picketing activities
which go beyond the mere communication of information. One of the
legitimate objectives of the picket line, they argue, is to persuade potential
replacements, customers and others, from patronizing the struck employer.
They contend, somewhat cynically perhaps, that a picket line is condemned
by its own success, and that if it is shown to hamper the employer in his
operation, it will be restricted or eliminated. In the Tilco case, Chief Justice
Gale alluded to a misconception held by certain leaders and members of trade
unions concerning the respective privileges of employers and employees.
"Employees," he observed, "have the right to strike, but, by the same token,
employers have the right to continue their operations and to protect their
property."' 5 Some trade unionists argue that this passage discloses a lack of
appreciation of the process. It is misleading, they argue, to speak of a right
in the employer to continue his operation during a strike; more accurately,
it is a question of the employer's ability to continue in the face of permissible
union sanctions and economic pressures. This important distinction is
recognized in the Task Force Report:
"The employer's power reciprocal to the strike is his ability to continue his operations. It is in the employee's interest, therefore, to seek to countervail against this
reciprocal power by persuading persons not to take employment or to do business
with the employer or handle, deal with or consume the employer's product."16

Many trade unionists feel that the labour relations boards would be more
inclined than the courts to accept the adversary context in which the strike
occurs, and to give freer rein to its legitimate and intended impact.
5. Trade unionists claim that there is a tendency in the courts to assume
that a picket line leads inevitably to violence. Support for this impression of
the judicial attitude is found in the Rand Report:
"Sooner or later pent up emotions erupt leaving in their wake a trail of injury
and damage."17

Elsewhere, the Report refers to the strike as an "environmental inconvenience"
and analogies are drawn between the Canadian labour scene and violence and
lawlessness in France (contemporary at the time the Report was written) and
in the cities of the United States. Trade unionists ask for justification for
those extravagant and provocative analogies, claiming that the Report fails
to offer evidence to support them. They say that there is a failure in the
courts, in the Rand Report, and, indeed, in the Task Force Report' s to
recognize that the vast majority of strikes are carried on without violence.
When violence does occur there is no evidence that it cannot be contained
and controlled within the provisions of the Criminal Code.
Will the Task Force's recommendations remove the effective control over
picketing from the courts? The answer, it seems to me, is clearly "no". As I
understand the recommendations, the "how" of picketing is to remain with
15 op. cit. footnote (5) at p. 578.
16 The Task Force, op. cit. para. 611, p. 177.

17 The Rand Report, op. cit. p. 31.
18 The Task Force, op. cit. para. 425, p. 133.
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the courts, with the substantive law unchanged. All of the existing torts will
remain: assault, battery, defamation, trespass and nuisance. On the other
hand, the so-called "industrial torts" (those torts arising from the "why",
"where" and "when" of picketing): conspiracy, inducing breach of contract,
interference with favourable trade relations, and intimidation will be codified,
with the common law repealed in respect of those situations where the new
code applies.1 9
The Report's recommendation on the content of the new codification is,
in some areas at least, vague. As to conspiracy (related to the "why" of
picketing), the Report suggests that "its legitimacy be determined through the
examination of legislative policy" and recommends that "picketing that runs
contrary to the policies of collective bargaining legislation" be forbidden. 20
Concerning the "when" of picketing, the Report would merely confirm
what appears to be the present state of common law: picketing would
be restricted to those situations where the right to strike has been
acquired, and organization and recognition picketing would be outlawed. Substantial changes are recommended in the "where" of picketing, which
would legitimize secondary picketing in certain carefully defined situations.
Only the "why", "where" and "when" of picketing would go to the reconstituted Canada Labour Relations Board, with the "how" remaining with the
courts.
What is the effect of all this? First, it would be entirely illusory to
expect that the courts would cease to play the major role in controlling
picketing under the Task Force proposals. In practice, the preponderance of
applications which seek to restrict picketing are based upon alleged commission of common law torts: nuisance, assault, etc. Under the Task Force's
proposal, these applications would still come before the courts. The consistent
refusal of our courts to countenance organization, recognition and secondary
picketing has meant that cases involving that type of picketing have decreased
in number and importance. Under the division of jurisdiction proposed, it is
probable that the Canada Board, initially at least, would be active in administering the new codification related to secondary picketing. Surely, however,
the important picketing disputes - Tilco Plastics, Oshawa Times and cases
of that sort - would still be determined by the courts. How does this square
with the Report's earlier observation that the courts are, at best, in an awkward
and uncomfortable position, and at times, perhaps, an impossible one, in
exercising control and responsibility over this area of industrial relations?
How is the "acceptability" problem solved when the contentious cases
remain in the courts?
Less important, but no less real, are potential problems of divided
jurisdiction. Suppose, for example, that an employer wishes to move to
enjoin picketing on alternate grounds, some falling within the jurisdiction of
the courts (say, for example, allegations of assault and nuisance) and some
within the jurisdiction of the Canada Board (relating, say, to the situs of the
19 Ibld, paras. 623-630 pp. 180-182.

2o Ibd, para. 623 p. 180.
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picketing or its timing). Would multiple proceedings be necessary? If so,
there would be cumbersome problems of timing, as well as duplication of
evidence and argument.
Is there any insuperable problem in conferring on a reconstituted Canada
Labour Relations Board the control over all aspects of picketing? It is perhaps
ironic - in view of the vigorous trade union opposition which the Report
has provoked-that the Rand Report expresses a desire to remove the issuance
of all injunctions in labour relations from the courts and to place that power21
wholly within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal which it proposes.
It is recognized that there may be a constitutional question as to the province's jurisdiction to clothe such an administrative tribunal with strictly
injunctive powers. However, the same problem would not appear to be
involved in implementing the Task Force's recommendations, limited as they
are to labour relations within the Federal sphere.
If the Bill recently introduced into the Ontario Legislature2 2 is any
indication, there is no immediate prospect in Ontario that either Wood's or
Rand's recommendations concerning the restriction or elimination of the
court's role in picketing matters will be followed. When questioned why the
Bill was silent on the subject, the Minister of Labour is reported in the press
to have observed that the control of picket-line activity is something within
the jurisdiction of courts of criminal jurisdiction. That comment, if accurately
reported, ignores 25 years of jurisprudence concerning the use of the equity
injunction in labour disputes. It is hoped that Parliament will react more
creatively, and that the control over all picketing within the Federal sphere
will be passed to an acceptable specialist tribunal.
The Rand Report, op. cit. p. 81.
22 Bill 167, An Act to amend the Labour Relations Act, 3rd Session, 28th Legislature, Ontario. (1st Reading June 22, 1970).
21

